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1 i have profited from Irwin (1991a) and drawn in Section I on Bhagwati (1992). I am
indebted to many conversations with John Chipman, Douglas Irwin, Paul Samuelson and
Martin Wolf over the years on the many topics I address in this lecture.
Having given a Harry Johnson Lecture four years ago in London,
I was startled to be invited to give yet another one today. But then I
recalled his unmatched productivity: his articles continued to be
published even after his death, the pipelines in several journals
being full of them. It is only appropriate then that he be honored
many times over. Also, in these days of preoccupation with
increasing returns to scale, such a proliferation of lectures in the
memory of a great economist is doubly fitting.
Since Harry Johnson was in the English tradition of taking his
theory from the real world's problems and then taking it back to talk
penetratingly about them, I thought it appropriate to address the
earlier Johnson Lecture to the threats posed currently to the
multilateral trading system by increasing resort to regionalism and
to aggressive unilateralism and by the difficulties attending the
completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.1
In the main, these questions relate to how we get to Universal Free
Trade for all, while not directly questioning whether Free Trade is
good for oneself.
Today, however, I plan to address the latter, more basic issue:
whether Free Trade for oneself is a desirable objective of policy in
the first place. This is, in fact, an issue that has remained at centre
stage of analysis for international economists ever since Adam
Smith discussed the division of labour and David Ricardo, following
1An expanded version of that lecture has subsequently been published as The World
Trading System at Risk, in Bhagwati (1991).
James Mill, formulated the doctrine of Comparative Advantage and
provided the essential theoretical case for Free Trade.
Since this case is critically dependent on the assumption that
market prices reflect social costs, the challenges to the doctrine of
Free Trade have come over the last two centuries from theorists
who focused on one or another market imperfection. The attendant
market failure implies that market prices no longer equate social
costs, requiring that the Invisible Hand, now frail and inadequate,
must be assisted and hence Free Trade can be improved upon by
intervention.
Thus, starting from the earliest theoretical arguments in the
first half of the 19th Century for infant industry protection and for
a tariff to exploit monopoly power in trade, in the writings of John
Stuart Mill and Robert Torrens, down to the postwar period when
during the 1950s through 1970s economists of my generation
analyzed factor market imperfections while in the 1980s our
students analyzed product market imperfections, the theorists of
commercial policy have continued to reexamine the essential case
for Free Trade and to design appropriate policy intervention in light
of the market failure at hand.
These "conventional" market failure-based challenges to Free
Trade have occasionally provided the intellectual support to
protectionist forces, and the theoretical developments in the 1980s
in the analysts of product market imperfections, (especially in the
small-group models of strategic interation) have certainly been
exploited in a general way to encourage' anti-Free-Trade sentiments
and to support protectionist policies by policymakers. There are
now however new challenges in the 1990s as we close this
millenium, that come from two altogether different directions that
have little to do with conventional market failures.
On the one hand, fear has grown in the developed countries, and
certainly in the United States, that Free Trade with the developing
countries will relentlessly drive down the real wages of unskilled
labour. Crippled by history, Marx is striking again: immiseration of
the proletariat is widely feared. With the redistributive state
everywhere at bay, the market-determined wage outcomes have also
become more important than ever. It then follows that, while Free
Trade is Pareto-better in the potential-compensation sense, its
adverse impact on income distribution in the absence of actual
compensation makes it an unattractive policy. In the United States,
where the stagnation in the real wages of the unskilled is often
attributed to free trade, the unions are thus strongly opposed to
embracing Free Trade with Mexico under the North American Free
Trade Agreement for much the same reason and the Clinton
Administration's early hesitation about NAFTA surely reflect these
fears.
At the same time, there has been an unprecedented increase in
demands for "level playing fields" as preconditions for Free Trade.
The presumption increasingly is that unless a large and growing
number of domestic policies such as environmental regulations and
labour standards are harmonised by industry across countries,
competition under Free Trade will be "unfair". Since few such
demands can be conceded, while nearly all are based on fallacious
reasoning, the implication is that Free Trade, perceived then to be
with "unfairly" trading rivals, will be under threat. Indeed, so it is:
one of the major obstacles to closing the NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round negotiations, for instance, has been precisely the pressure
brought on the Clinton administration to accomodate the
environmental lobbies on these matters.
Before I turn to these new challenges in greater depth,
considering both their policy origins and their theoretical
implications, permit me to put the conventional market-failure-
based challenges into historical perspective so that the important
developments in the scientific 1980s, which are still cited by many
policymaking politicians and bureaucrats as legitimation for
protectionist moves in the 1990s, are better assessed.
I. The Conventional Challenges
The theoretical arguments for infant industry protection and a
tariff to exploit monopoly power in trade remained the only serious
intellectual challenges to the Free Trade through the 19th Century
and the early 20th Century.1
(1)The first, and policywise the most influential, in new
argument against Free Trade thereafter came with the onset of the
Great Depression. In the lecture on Free Trade and Modern
Economics, in 1951 to the Manchester Statistical Society, John
Hicks (1959, p.48) recounted how the unemployment of these years
had seriously undermined the belief in the doctrine of Free Trade:
The main thing which caused so much liberal opinion in England to lose
1The key historical references to these arguments are Mill (1848) and Torrens
(1844) .
its faith in Free trade was the helplessness of the older liberalism in the face of
massive unemployment, and the possibility of using import restriction as an
element in an active programme fighting unemployment. One is, of course, obliged
to associate this line of thought with the name of Keynes. It was this, almost alone,
which led Keynes to abandon his early belief in Free Trade.
Keynes1 apostasy on Free Trade had been suggested in A
Treatise on Money (1930) and in his evidence before the MacMillan
Committee in February 1930 where he offered the view that tariffs,
while unwise as a long term policy, could immediately alleviate the
slump.1 This viewpoint however became more pronounced in Keynes'
thinking and writings through 1931, resulting in a celebrated
controversy with Lionel Robbins and the Beveridge (1931 )-led
riposte by Robbins, Hicks Q±. a l to Keynes in Tariffs: The Case
Examined.
Interestingly, Keynes seems to have anticipated the later
objection that the superior intervention to achieve full employment
was domestic reflation rather than expenditure-switching
protection:2
If nations can learn to provide themselves with full employment by their
domestic policy... there would no longer be a pressing motive why one country
need force its wares on another or repulse the offerings of its neighbors.
Later theoretical analysis would then show how, under fixed
exchange rates, the reflation would cause external imbalance and
therefore the two policies, reflation and devaluation, would be
generally necessary to attain the two targets of external and
internal balance. Tariffs would then appear to be inferior to the
1I am indebted to Barry Eichengreen (1984), Bernard Wolf and Nicholas Smook
(1988) and Douglas Irwin (1991b), who offer a richly textured analysis of Keynes1
views on Free Trade.
2Cited in Irwin (1991b). Joan Robinson (1937) and Nicholas Kaldor (1950-51)
analyzed further the argument that expenditure-switching policies to deflect
expenditure onto oneself were "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies.
7optimal combination of devaluation and reflation as the policy
solution to unemployment.
But these insights came later. During the 1930s, Keynes1
renunciation of the doctrine of Free Trade remained a potent source
of disbelief in the doctrine. Combined with the massive
unemployment unleased by the Great Depression and the lingering
aftermath of its distress, this apostasy turned the 1930s into the
most deadly episode among the challenges to the doctrine of Free
Trade.
(2) The 1930s also witnessed the emergence of a threat to
Free Trade from an altogether different direction. It came, not from
economic circumstance driving revisionism but entirely from
autonomous theoretical progress: and that too in a curiously
tangential way.
As the 1920s ended, Edward Chamberlin (1929) and Joan
Robinson (1931) independently came up with important theoretical
analyses of imperfect competition, opening up to systematic
exploration the middle ground between perfect competition and pure
monopoly.1 The result was to undermine seriously the notion that
market prices reflected social costs, calling into question more
widely the virtue of laissez faire, and, more narrowly with it, the
merit of Free Trade as well.
1
 There are differences between the two pioneers. In particular, Chamberlin's analysis
was deeper on product differentiation whereas Mrs. Robinson's analysis of monopsony
and price discrimination would prove seminal. Chamberlin insisted on differentiating
his analysis of "monopolistic" from Mrs. Robinson's analysis of "imperfect" competition.
Among those innocent of the resulting acrimony wasJH.D. Henderson (the Drummond
Professor of Political Economy at Oxford at the time). Presiding over Chamberlin's
lecture at All Souls College, Henderson introduced him, with unintended double entendre,
as the "father of the theory of imperfect competition".
8The economists of the Chicago School correctly saw this as a
threat that would legitimate interventionism. Therefore, they
proceeded to counter the threat by taking to econometrics to
demonstrate that, although markets seemed imperfect to the naked
eye, in reality there was "as if" or "working" competition and that
the imperfections were not of enough consequence to require policy
intervention. Today, we talk, not of "as if" competition but of
"contestable markets": but, by and large, the key thought is the same.
Despite Chicago's riposte, however, the skepticism about
prices not reflecting social costs due to imperfect competition
remained a potent source of erosion in the belief that Free Trade
was a desirable policy. In his 1951 Lecture, analyzing the different
reasons why the doctrine of Free Trade had lost "much of its
strength" and " been called into question"1, John Hicks (1959, p.46)
captured this reality well:
....the Monopoly-Competition argument...is of much less practical importance
than the others, but it deserves at least a passing mention, because of the
undoubted influence which it undoubtedly exercises — in a negative sort of way
— upon the minds of economics students.... If apparent costs only equal true
costs under conditions of perfect competition, and competition hardly ever is
perfect, the bottom seems to drop out of the Free Trade argument. This is in fact
a fair description of the state of mind which quite a number of economic students
seem to have reached.
But the damage that the theory of imperfect competition did to
the policy of Free Trade cannot be argued, as Hicks also suggests, to
have been serious. There were two reasons. First, there was
nothing in economic circumstance that led to the demand for
1
 Hicks writes: "Free Trade is no longer accepted by economists, even as an ideal, in the
way it used to be. Economists has not lost authority, but the preponderance of economic
opinion is no longer so certainly as it was on the Free Trade side." (1959, pp.41-42)
protection, citing this kind of theory: the attack on Free Trade was
of the nihilistic variety, hard to tap by specific interest groups.
Besides, Free Trade was already imperilled far more seriously by
Keynes's desertion, by the economic circumstance of massive
unemployment, and by the new macroeconomic ideas that I
discussed. When economists returned to imperfect competition in
the 1980s, the threat would become serious: economic circumstance
would have changed, with more compelling craving for protection,
and the idiom and substance of the new work on imperfect
competition would be more readily accessible for exploitation and
capture by the protectionist interests.
(3) Let me then turn immediately to the postwar period. The
1950s through 1970s were the decades of increasingly freer trade in
the developed countries. Successive GATT Rounds of negotiations
brought tariffs down to low levels. Trade expansion and income
growth interacted virtuously to make these two decades the Golden
Age that the later, more troubled years in the 1970s would contrast
unhappily with. In this respect, this was again the heyday of Free
Trade.
But the increasing trade liberalization of the developed
countries contrasted with the turn to import substitution and
protectionist policies in much of the underdeveloped world. The
newly-independent developing countries were determined to use the
"infant industry" argument freely to support nascent industries.
Equally, they considered these industries to be necessary features of
a modern economy and society, implying what international
economists in the 1960s would call a "non-economic" preference.
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Besides, it was widely believed that the developing countries were
characterized by a number of market imperfections, the principal
ones being in factor markets: distorting intersectoral wage
differentials, sticky wages such that the market wage exceeded the
shadow wage, sector-specific minimum wages and monopsony. All
these implied market failure which would seem to require
protection.
Interestingly, therefore, since trade theory often responds to
reality, the major developments in the theory of commercial policy
during this period came from, not the developed-country
liberalization (though, the growth of the European Common Market
did stimulate the new theory of customs and preferential trade
liberalization)1, but rather from the developing-country concerns
and policies of protection.
Thus, the theory of optimal policy intervention in the presence
of non-economic objectives was fuelled by these concerns: its major
contours were established in contributions by Corden(1957),
Johnson(1965a), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) and many others.2
But, much more so, there was an explosion of theoretical
developments concerning the optimal, and second-best, policies to
remedy the distorting effects of several different factor market
imperfections.
1
 Starting with Viner (1950), who pioneered the distinction between trade diversion and
trade creation, there were important contributions by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-
57), Lipsey (1957), Meade (1955), Johnson(1958a, 1958b), and many others.
2The influence of developing-country concerns is most evident in many other
contributions to this literature, especially by Johnson (1965b), Bhagwati (1968), and
Cooper and Massell (1965a, 1965b).
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However, these developments led to a most important twist in
favor of Free Trade. Instead of underlining the need for protection
to fix these market failures, these analyses led to the conclusion
that the best way to address domestic distortions (such as most
factor market imperfections) was through domestic policy
interventions, and that in these cases protection was at best a
second-best measure.
The net effect of this central insight was to narrow, not
widen, the case for protection since until then it was commonly
believed that protection was the appropriate way to handle all kinds
of market failure. Now, protection was seen to be the first-best
policy only when the distortion was foreign, not domestic.1
This insight applied equally to the important question of non-
economic objectives. Symmetrically, the trade theorists showed
that only when the non-economic objective was in the foreign sector
(e.g. one wanted to reduce imports in the pursuit of "self-
sufficiency"), the optimal intervention would be in the shape of
protection; in other cases, it required domestic policy intervention.
Thus, the 1980s through 1970s were characterized by
contrasting phenomena:
*a substantial threat to Free Trade from the demands for
protection from the many developing countries which, in fact,
1I might add that this was fully understood only by sophisticated economists. In the late
1970s, when the US auto industry was looking for protection, my phone at MIT rang. A
senior executive at one of the Big Three Detroit firms wanted to get me to write a paper
for them, arguing for protectionist relief to the auto industry. He claimed that he had
heard that I had developed arguments for protection in the scientific literature.
Evidently, his economist informant was confusing my many analyses of market
imperfections with protectionist conclusions, if not sympathies.
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embraced extensive protection as part of their developmental
strategy of import substitution; and a reduced threat to Free Trade
from the developed countries which pursued trade liberalization
instead; and
*a substantial concern with market failure (through factor
markets) and non-economic objectives, both stemming from
developing-country concerns, which implied increased legitimacy
for intervention and presumably therefore for trade protection; and a
strengthening of the theoretical case for Free Trade because
theoretical analysis, stimulated by these questions, showed that the
appropriate intervention required was mostly in domestic markets,
not in the form of trade protection.
(4) The 1980s shared with the 1950s-1970s the distinction of
having the theory of Free Trade extended in the realm of imperfect
competition. But whereas the earlier period was concerned with
factor market imperfections, the latter period was concerned with
product market imperfections.
In turn, this reflected a shift from preoccupation with
protectionism in the developing countries to preoccupation with
protectionism in the developed countries. In fact, by the end of the
1970s, the combination of economic writings and far-ranging
research into the costs of import substitution and the benefits of
export promotion, conditionality imposed by the World Bank on the
basis of these ideas and findings, and the example provided by the
successful export-promoting nations of the Far East, had led to
growing trade liberalization among the developing countries.
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By contrast, the developed countries had lapsed into resorting
to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in lieu of the reduced tariffs "bound" at
the GATT. In fact, the rise of NTBs, in shape of Voluntary Export
Restraints and "administered protection" in shape of the unfair use
of fair trade mechanisms such as anti-dumping (AD) actions and
(subsidy-) countervailing duties (CVD), got quite out of hand in both
the EC and in the United States, beginning the early 1980s.
The growth of protectionist outcomes reflected increases in
both the "demand for", and the "supply of", protection. The demand
for protection had escalated to unmanageable levels owing to the
Volcker-led recession. In addition, the United States suffered from
serious dollar overvaluation during the first Reagan administration.
The United States was also succumbing to a return of the
"diminished giant syndrome" (Bhagwati and Irwin, 1987).
The intense competition among the firms of the developed
countries, and the desire to protect against inroads by foreign
rivals, then provided the context within which the theoretical
developments, analyzing the interventionist implications of the
large-group model of imperfect competition, and more pointedly of
the small-group oligopolistic models, were set. They caught the
protectionist fancy, met the protectionist needs, and therefore
immediately got into the centre stage of public policy debate.
From the protectionist viewpoint, therefore, the imperfect-
competition models of the 1950s through 1970s were popular in the
developing countries as legitimating (to the uncritical eye) their
protectionism. The imperfect-competitioTi models of the 1980s
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were equally popular in the developed countries as legitimating (to
the uncritical eye) their protectionism.
As for policy, the theorists of the imperfect-competition-in-
product-markets themselves have returned to the fold of Free Trade
in one of two ways. (i)Either, they have followed the "Chicago
school" approach of saying that the market imperfections do not
amount to a hill of beans and should therefore be ignored by
policymakers. This is the view embraced, in varying degrees, by
economists such as Gene Grossman (1986) who argue, for instance,
that rent-shifting towards oneself by using trade policy in
oligopolistic industries, scientifically shown to be a good policy
intervention, requires that there be significant rents to shift; but
that arguably there are few such rents in reality.
(ii) Else, they have followed the more conservative "Public
choice school" approach which essentially argues that the visible
had will strangulate: intervention will produce worse outcomes than
the imperfect markets that we seek to fix. This can happen if you
have a predatory view of government, which should not be surprising.
But it comes from the public-choice-theoretic view that special-
interest lobbying will distort the outcome. Paul Krugman (1987) has
taken this view.
I should add however that the theoretical developments in the
1980s, were not one-sided. The case for Free Trade was
strengthened indirectly by the new interest in political-economy-
theoretic modelling that has by now become a compelling trend in
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economic theorizing more generally.1 In particular, the notion that
the cost of protection was low and therefore unworthy of policy
attention simply because the deadweight losses measured a la Harry
Johnson et. al. were a small fraction of the national income, was
seen as naive when the induced rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974) or
revenue-seeking (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1980) was taken into
account. The general theory of DUP (directly unproductive profit-
seeking) activities (Bhagwati, 1982) considers alternative ways in
which resource-using but zero-output-producing (and income-
earning) activities can result from lobbying for policy change to
redistribute income towards oneself (as with tariffs) or through
lobbying to share in the rents ro revenues from existing policies (as
when lobbies compete for rent-fetching import quotas already in
place). Such DUP activities could add significantly to the
deadweight cost of protection.2
While therefore the 1980s began by marrying the rising
protectionist demand in the developed countries to the theoretical
developments in the theory of imperfect competition in product
markets, and protectionism did break out, making the period one of
high threat to Free Trade, it ended with the proponents of the theory
backing off into Free Trade and with the new developments in the
political-economy theory of DUP and rent-seeking activities
strengthening the case against protection.
1See the detailed argument concerning this in my Harms Prize Lecture, Bhagwati
( 1 9 8 9 ) .
2Cf. Varian (1989) for measurement problems and Hillman and Riley (1989) on the
analysis as to whether a dollar worth of rents would lead to a dollar worth of resource
loss due to rent-seeking. A voluminous literature on the latter question is now
available.
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II. The New Challenges
But new challenges have arisen, as I noted at the outset, proving
the adage that a free trader's life will not suffer from the ennui that
follows success. Demands for fair trade and harmonisation of domestic
policies and institutions in trading nations as preconditions for Free
Trade have multiplied. Equally, there is widespread concern that trade
liberalization with the poor countries will impoverish the workers of the
rich countries: a fear articulated eloquently by Ross Perot and Pat
Choate(l993) in their denunciation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement with Mexico as "a drastic and unfair scheme" that "will pit
American and Mexican workers in a race to the bottom".
Fair Trade as Precondition for Free Trade
The demands for partial or total harmonisation of domestic
policies, such as environmental and labour standards,and domestic
institutions, such as the retail distribution systems and technology
policies, have grown recently for a variety of reasons, even though a
trade economist would normally consider diversity among trading nations
to be good, rather than bad, for mutually-gainful trade.1
One reason, perhaps the most potent, is that protectionist
demands are more likely to meet with approval if, instead of saying that
you need help because you cannot compete, you claim that the
Of course, harmonising "standards" is not the same as harmonising tastes or endowments.
The latter will reduce gains from trade by reducing the diversity that produces trade. But
getting another country to, say, adopt a minimum wage sim ilar to one's own may increase
one's gains from trade by increasing its demand for one's exports at a given terms of
trade.
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foreigner is gaining because of his resort to unfair trade.2 The enormous
use of even conventional fair trade mechanisms, such as the levying of
anti-dumping and countervailing duties (designed to offset foreign
subsidies) in the 1980s is to be explained, not in terms of a genuine rise
in the phenomena of predatory dumping and foreign subsidisation, but
as Stigler-type capture of these mechanisms for protectionist purposes.
Ironically, these fair trade institutions have been used unfairly to get
protection rather than to maintain free trade.
In my view, however, a major contributory factor has been the
globalisation of the world economy and the fact that today, with the
shares of trade to GNP having risen virtually everywhere in the last two
decades, a great number of activities are now subject to international
competition. Then again, among the OECD countries [as Baumol,
Blackman and Wolff (1989) have documented], there has been
considerable convergence of technical knowhow, partly brought about by
the global activities of multinationals, so that more industries than ever
before are "footloose": The number of industries that are "shiftable" due to
someone else gaining a small new advantage seems to have swelled.
The result is kaleidoscopic comparative advantage, a kind of knife
edge, where one day I have comparative advantage in X and you in Y,
and tomorrow it may be the other way around, and then back again: a
sort of musical chairs.3 Then two consequences follow, each relevant to
one of the two new challenges to Free Trade that I have distinguished.
First, in this threatening new world, producers will become very
2
 Cf. Bhagwati (1991c) for a fuller analysis of other factors contributing to the rise of unfair trade
concerns.
3
 Cf. Bhagwati (I99la)(l99lb).
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sensitive to the possibility that their foreign competitors are deriving their
lethal competitive edge because of some "unfair" advantage that they
"should not" have. Each will be looking over the others' shoulders to see
if some domestic institution or policy is fetching such unfair advantage to
them. The fact that they do not have the same environmental
regulations, that they do not have to meet the same safety standards, are
among the most common complaints today in the countries which have
stiffer standards, these being generally the OECD countries.
As the recently-concluded NAFTA "supplemental" agreements on
these questions suggest, since President Salinas of Mexico had to agree
to raising the minimum wage in Mexico, it is only a short step, if not a
slippery slope, to then asking that even wages be raised in the poor
countries if free trade is to be permitted with them: the infamous "pauper-
labour" argument would be resurrected.
The second consequence is that the volatility of comparative
advantage will lead to greater labour turnover and hence could impede
the acquisition of skills on the job, thus flattening the growth curve of
earnings for labour. As argued in Bhagwati (I99la)(l99lb) and formalised
in Dehejia (I992), a rolling stone gathers no moss and a moving worker
gains no skills.4 We may then have here a rather novel reason why trade
may impact adversely on wages, contributing to the second new
challenge to Free Trade that I consider below.
Returning to the question of fair trade, however, it is evident that
the belief that harmonisation of domestic policies and institutions is
4
 An Economics Focus column in The Economist (I993) cites a forthcoming OECD study
that confirms the relationship between turnover and skill acquisition hypothesised in
Bhagwati (I99la).
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generally essential prior to Free Trade is based on the erroneous notion
that .without such harmonisation, trade will cease to be a mutual-gain
phenomenon and will instead lead to predation. Economic analysis can
readily confirm that this is a false notion, in general. Diversity of domestic
policies, institutions and standards is generally compatible with gainful
Free Trade.
Nonetheless, the popular assumption and demand today is that if
your rival abroad has lower environmental and labor standards, that
amounts to "social dumping" by him in your market and therefore you
should be permitted to impose countervailing import duties. This notion,
gaining ground in EC and the US, is based on two obvious fallacies: (i)
the differences in standards in the same industries as between countries
will reflect legitimately different priorities among nations in their
objectives, as when Mexico may prefer to use its budget on prevention of
pollution of a lake by chemicals from paper mills rather than to reduce
CO2 emissions from lead-containing fuel whereas the US prefers it the
other way around; and (ii) the same general standards, such as taxing of
CO2 emissions, will generally produce non-neutral effects on
comparative advantage (whereas focus on cross-national within-same-
industry comparisons of environmental and such "burdens" focuses
mistakenly on absolute advantage).
Besides, it is evident that this approach opens a Pandora's box.
Once it is admitted, despite lack of economic logit, that cost differences
due to differential domestic policies can be countervailed, even if it is
originally in the context of "good" causes such as environmental and
labour, it becomes an invitation to protectionists to cite ever more such
20
reasons for imposing countervailing duties: a tendency already manifest
in the US in relation to the highly-competitive trade with Japan and the
NAFTA negotiations as well.5
Trade and Wages6
The other, equally potent, challenge to Free Trade comes from the
fear of the income-distributional effects of trade with the South. Indeed, it
is curious that there has been a reversal of attitutes among the countries
of the North and of the South when trade between them is appraised,
During the 1950s and 1960s, much of the South regarded trade with the
North as a threat, not as an opportunity, was feared that without
protection it could not industrialise, and turned to import substitution
while the North was opening to the South (as to itself) through extensive
liberalisation. Today, starting with the late 1980s, there have been fearful
voices in the North, dreading trade with the poor South as a recipe for
descent into the wages and working conditions of these impoverished
nations, whereas many in the South now see trade with the a North as an
opportunity, not a peril. The contrast between Mexico's and the US
Congress' reaction to NAFTA is a stark example of this role reversal.
Interestingly, the major theoretical construct which, implicitly or
explicitly, has provided the intellectual support, and lent the air of
plausibility, to the fears in the North of immiseration of the unskilled from
5
 The full range of analytical issues raised by the demands for harmonisation of domestic
policies and institutions is addressed in a number of papers being written under a Ford
Foundation-financed project on Fair Trade Claims and Gains from Trade, directed by me
and Professor Robert Hudec of the University of Minnesota Law School.
6
 The arguments in this section have been developed more fully in Bhagwati and Dehejia
(1993).
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freer witht the South has been the celebrated Factor Price Equalization
(FPE) theorem [and the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem which shows
the adverse impact of Free Trade on the factor of production that is
scarce in the country relative to abroad in the country's trading partners,
i.e. presumably unskilled labour in the North vis-a-vis unskilled labour in
the South, relative to other factors of production such as capital].7
It is interesting, of course, that when Paul Samuelson (1948)
(1949) wrote his famous pair of articles on the FPE theorem in
The Economic Journal, the theorem was considered at first to be
implausible and hence possibly wrong, and then to be little more than a
theoretical curiosum.6 At the same time, when Wassily Leontief came up
with his startling finding that the US was exporting labout-intensive
exports, the search for explanations that was set off primarily focused on
the reasons why the FPE theorem, building on the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model, would not hold in the real world because one or more
of the sufficiency conditions (such as absence of factor-intensity
reversals) were unrealistic. In short, the approach to the FPE theorem
was not that it defined reality; rather it was that the theorem provided the
researcher with the necessary clues as to why it did not.
By contrast, the tendency today is to regard FPE as as
inescapable destiny: with the (unskilled) proletariat facing an inevitable
immiseration or, at minimum, a heavy drag on the rise of its real wages.
7
 In the symmetric n x n case, the FPE theorem implies the SS theorem (as stated above),
but the SS theorem does not imply the FPE theorem. In principle, it is enough to have
the SS theorem to generate the fears that, if one is importing labour-intensive goods from
the poor, labour-abundant South, Free Trade will harm the real wage of labour.
8
 Paul Samuelson informs me that his 1949 article was written to explicate the results of
the 1948 article and that two articles skeptical of the latter had to be destroyed in proof by
The Economic Journal.
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But it is time to remind ouselves that the original view of the FPE theorem
was correct: its assumptions are indeed extraordinarily demanding. It is
not therefore a compelling, or adequate, guide to real-world phenomena.
Consider, in particular, just three reasons why the presumption
that real wages in the North and the South will converge as a result of
Free Trade can be considered unrealistic. I will relate them to the SS
theorem instead, assuming that the Rich country is importing (unskilled)
labour-intensive goods and exporting (human and physical) capital-
intensive goods and that the terms of trade improve when trade is freed.
In this (2 x 2) version of the theorem, which is consonant with the FPE
theorem, the real wage of unskilled labour falls.9
1. Scale Economies: Scale economies can invalidate the SS
theorem, causing both factors' real wages to rise. The reason is obvious:
the redistributive effect which militates against the real wage of unskilled
labour can be outweighed by the lifting-all-boats effect of scale
economies on the marginal products and hence real wages of both
factors.
The first theoretical demonstration of this phenomenon was by
Arvind Panagariya (1981) who modelled scale economies in the old way
where they were external to the firm but internal to the industry, thus
retaining our ability to work with models of perfect competition.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) established the same conclusion in
the context of scale economies internal to the firm, and hence under
9
 Thus, instead of focusing on whether there is convergence of real wages in South and
North, we focus directly on the question on centre stage: will cheaper labour-intensive
imports from the South under freer trade cause our real wages of the unskilled to fall? In
principle, of course, it is theoretically possible for the latter to occur while FPE fails: e.g.
the factors that militate against SS, detailed above, may hold in the South and not in the
North!
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imperfect competition. Their analysis was, however, restricted to the
special case where the output per firm did not rise with trade so that the
added gains from trade were due to variety rather than reduced cost
thanks to scale. Brown, Deardorff and Sterm(1993) have now produced
a more general and illuminating analysis allowing for both these (and
other) effects.
2. Diversification: The SS theorem (as also the FPE theorem)
depend on the equalibria under autarky and free trade lying in the
diversification cone, i.e. trade should not lead to complete specialization.
When it does, the unique relationship between goods and factor prices
breaks down: while the factor prices are unique at complet specialization
on a good, goods prices are manifestly not since raising prices for the
good will be compatible with continued specialization on the good.10
Equally, while the SS redistributive effect operates as long as
trade shifts production towards a good without causing complete
specialization, once specialization is achieved, any further rise in that
good's (relative) price will clearly mean that both factors will gain from it:
the lifting-all-boats effect from this improvement in the terms of trade
(implied by the rise in the relative price of the specialized good where,
and in terms of which, their reward is fixed at specialization) will ensue.
The net effect could be to leave both factors better off under free trade
than under autarky.
But this lifting-all-boats effect will help each factor proportionately
to how much it consumes of the cheaper imported goods, of course.
Hence it is pertinent to observe that, as the work of William Cline (1990)
am working here with the 2 x 2 version of the SS and FPE theorems.
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on textiles shows and as casual empiricism suggests for other imported
goods such as low-quality footwear, the groups at the botom of the
income distribution (which must include the unskilled) disproportionately
spend their incomes on imported goods whose prices are heavily
influenced by protection (such as the VERs on footwear and the MFA on
textiles). Deardorff and Haveman (1992) have made the complementary
observation that the invoking of administered protection has been
typically for industries which are not intensive in the incidence of poverty
in their workforce suggesting that protection so given is, in its direct effect,
to the (relative) disadvantage of the industries that are and hence of the
poor.
3. Trade and Competition: The lifting-all-boats effect can also
arise if trade means more competition and discipline, causing x-efficiency
effects which may be captured analytically as Hicks-neutral technical
change. If this is done, and it is assumed that the effect operates
throughout the economy, in both traded sectors, then clearly both factors
get their real wages inproving from this, countervailing and possibly
reversing the fall in the real wage of the SS-impacted factor.
But, even if we were to assume that the production-function-
improvement arises differentially more in theimport-competing sectors,
then we can see immediately from the early work on the general-
equilibrium income-elasticities of supply under technical change11 that,
ceteris paribus, the effect will be to raise the real wage of the factor
intensively used in these sectors: i.e. of unskilled labour in this instance.
The econometric evidence on this hypothesis is hard to find.
Cf. the beautiful paper by Findlay and Grubert (1959).
25
However, Jim Levinsohn's (1993) recent work on the imports-as-
competition hypothesis, while not exactly specified in the manner
suggested here, and successful in testing that hypothesis with the use of
Turkish industry data under near-controlled-experiment conditions, does
suggest that my specification of the effects of trade on technical change
via competition may also be borne out. As in many areas we discuss in
this paper, we must confess that ideas and hypotheses outrun plausible
econometric evidence, suggesting more questions.
In fact, the general consensus that seems to be building now
among the labour and trade economists studying the 1980's wages-of-
the-unskilled experience is that trade is not a significant cause of the
phenomenon and that the true culprit is technology and technical
change.12
The new information technology is reinforcing Griliches' (1969)
original view that skilled labour is relatively more complementary to
capital: a computer can displace several unskilled workers and create a
job for one skilled operator.13 The impact of both sources of growth,
capital accumulation and technical change, can then be to reduce, not
increase, the real wage of the unskilled.
Marx may indeed be striking again, but not with the assistance of
Samuelson.14 The task before us then is to make this amply clear before
the fear of trade with the "Asiatic ants" and the "reserve army" of cheap
12
 For a detailed review and analysis, see Bhagwati and Dehejia (1993).
13
 See the evidence in Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987), Berndt and Morrison (1991) and
Krueger (1993), for instance.
14
 For empirical studies linking technical change to wages, see in particular Bound and
Johnson (1992), Davis and Haltivanger (1991) and Mincer (1991). I have not dealt here in
depth with the rolling-stone-gathers-no-moss linkage between trade and wages, touched
upon in this section, because no empirical exportation of it is yet available.
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labour in the poor countries gets out of hand.
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